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As Abdelaziz Bouteflika begins his fourth term as Algeria’s president, questions persist over 
his regime’s survival. Why has it endured while those of Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Libya’s Qaddafi 
have not? What has Bouteflika done differently? What sets Algeria apart? The aim of this paper 
is to address these questions by using Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s (2010) celebrated 
model for explaining democratisation to chart and examine Algeria’s links to European and 
North American countries, the amount of leverage Western governments have over Algiers, 
and the Bouteflika regime’s organisational strength. The paper concludes that Europe and 
North America have little appetite and only limited means to press Algeria to democratise and 
that the regime possesses strong coercive capabilities. Together, these factors have helped 
ensure Bouteflika’s survival. 
 
Keywords:  Algeria; Maghreb; Arab Spring; Levitsky and Way; Competitive 
Authoritarian; Democratisation; Linkage; Leverage; Organisational Power 
 
1. Introduction 
More than any other ballot in Algeria’s recent history, the 2014 presidential election was 
marked by genuine doubt. Staged against the backdrops of the Maghreb Spring and Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika’s continued ill health (Martín 2013, p. 69), uncertainty and speculation abounded 
over what might happen.1 Would this be the moment when the country finally succumbed to 
the tide of change that had already swept neighbouring Tunisia, Libya and Egypt? Could the 
military backed regime engineer an unprecedented fourth election victory for a candidate who 
was so obviously unwell? Would Bouteflika survive the rigours of the election campaign? Did 
                                                          
1 The term Maghreb Spring refers to the wide range of events, demands, initiatives and actors that together 
comprise the Arab Awakening as it manifests itself in Northwest Africa. 
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his candidacy indicate the regime’s lack of imagination and options, and herald its possible 
demise? Might the army’s iron grip on the political system finally be loosening? 
In the end, many of these doubts were swept away by Bouteflika’s emphatic victory.2 
News of his triumph did not spark any great outpourings of discontent or disbelief. There was 
no march on the capital. Government buildings were not attacked and occupied. Boroughs and 
districts that had voted against him did not rebel. The regime prevailed and, in so doing, 
confirmed both its strength and capacity to endure. For in a climate of regional political 
upheaval in which voters were no longer afraid to demand and agitate for change, it had 
successfully orchestrated the re-election of a candidate who was 77 years old, had held a senior 
political post for long periods since independence,3 had already been in office for one and a 
half decades, and was so ill he could barely stand. 
The removal of these doubts, for a little while at least, have in turn raised pressing 
questions about the country’s democratic process, the ongoing vigour of the Maghreb Spring 
and the ability of democratisation scholars to explain and anticipate the development of 
political systems. Why has Algeria not gone the way of Tunisia and Libya despite having so 
much in common with them? Do the subdued domestic and international reactions to the 
election mark the ebbing of the Spring tide? And how do democratisation scholars account for 
Algeria’s difference? The aim of this paper is to address these questions by drawing on 
Levitsky and Way’s (2010) dimensions of linkage, leverage and organisational power to 
explain the survival of President Bouteflika’s regime. 
In so doing, the paper makes three valuable and original contributions. To begin with, 
it is the first to use Levitsky and Way’s dimensions to structure an analysis of Algeria’s recent 
political development. This unique approach leads it to place special emphasis on Algeria’s 
changed relationship with Europe and North America, and ways in which President Bouteflika 
exercises greater control over his country’s coercive capabilities than did either Ben Ali or 
Gadhafi. To be clear, the paper makes no claim as to the originality of the information it 
includes, only to the way this information is organised and the factors it focuses on. This 
approach is consistent with that adopted by Levitsky and Way in their 2010 book as they also 
                                                          
2 Bouteflika won over 80% of the votes cast (Markey and Chikhi 2014, p. 1). 
3 After serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1963 to 1978, Bouteflika was one of the frontrunners to succeed 
President Houari Boumedienne when he died in December 1978. Then in 1989, after spending six years in self-
imposed exile to avoid corruption charges, Bouteflika re-joined the ruling National Liberation Front’s (Front de 
Libération Nationale, FLN) Central Committee before being elected president in April 1999 (Lowi 2009, p. 129). 
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relied upon existing studies of each of their cases. By using these dimensions to structure its 
examination, the paper lays the organisational groundwork for Algeria’s systematic 
comparison with its neighbours. The paper does not attempt this comparison itself. 
Second, by seeking to explain Algeria’s recent political experiences, the paper 
addresses the shortfall of studies into the country during this critical period. Post-independence 
Algeria has often struggled to command the same level of scholarly attention as its Maghreb 
neighbours. And this comparative neglect has been particularly pronounced over the last few 
years because of the heightened dramas elsewhere. Perhaps inevitably, the scholarly eye has 
been drawn to the spectacular and significant developments that have taken place in Tunisia 
and Libya. The intense and widespread protests that quickly drove Ben Ali to flee, and the 
brutal civil war that fractured Libya and led to Gadhafi’s death have invited more urgent 
investigation than Algeria’s more limited and less effective demonstrations (Layachi 2014, p. 
136). By exploring what has happened in Algeria, the paper casts new light on the Maghreb 
Spring. 
And third, the paper extends the application and broadens the applicability of Levitsky 
and Way’s model. The paper is the first to use their dimensions of linkage, leverage and 
organisational power to examine Algeria’s recent political development. In so doing, it not only 
extends their model to a group of countries (the Maghreb) that defy convenient categorisation 
as African, Middle Eastern or European and are, therefore, only imperfectly covered by 
existing analyses of cases from each of these regions,4  but it also confirms the model’s utility 
in explaining democratisation in places where the military holds tutelary power. For when 
selecting the case studies for their 2010 book, Levitsky and Way purposefully excluded ‘other 
types of hybrid (or “partly free”) regime[]’ including those ‘in which top executive positions 
are filled via elections but the authority of elected governments is seriously constrained by the 
military or other nonelected bodies’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 32). They did so on the 
grounds that ‘in all of these regimes, the power of actors outside the electoral process generates 
a distinct set of dynamics and challenges not found under competitive authoritarianism’ 
(Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 32).  
                                                          
4 The Maghreb has long been considered a special region. Located at the geo-cultural intersection between Africa, 
the Middle East and Europe, its countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) are bound by 
commonalities that distinguish them from everywhere else (Humbaraci 1996, p. 10 and Willis 2012, p. 9). As a 
result, none of the various African, Asian and European case studies considered in Levitsky and Way’s 2010 book 
completely speak to the Maghreb’ 
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This decision raises two important concerns. First, that they chose their case studies to 
support their thesis. Second, that by excluding military backed and controlled regimes, they 
limited their model’s claim to universality. For there are numerous countries in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and elsewhere in which the armed forces are politically influential or dominant. 
If none of these can be considered, large swathes of the world are potentially placed beyond 
their model’s explanatory power. This paper uses Algeria to demonstrate the falsity of this 
limit. 
The paper is organised along the same lines as each of their original case studies. 
Accordingly, it assesses the type and strength of Algeria’s links to Europe and North America, 
the degree of leverage Washington, London, Paris and Brussels have over Algiers, and the 
strength of the Bouteflika regime’s organisational power. It then moves on to trace the origins 
and development of the Algerian regime. In fact, the paper’s only structural innovation is a 
short section at the start defining the dimensions of linkage, leverage and organisational power. 
 
2. An overview of linkage, leverage and organisational power 
In 2010 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way published their celebrated and highly influential book, 
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War.5 Its premise was that the 
end of the Cold War triggered a sharp decline in international tolerance of authoritarian 
practices and the regimes that employed them. Confronted by this new, far less sympathetic 
international environment, many of these regimes, but by no means all, were forced to change. 
Some, like Poland and Estonia, did so fundamentally to become fully functioning democracies. 
Yet others did so only partially. They adopted some or more of the trappings of democracy but 
fell short of becoming fully democratic. In these countries, ‘electoral manipulation, unfair 
media access, abuse of state resources, and varying degrees of harassment and violence skewed 
the playing field in favour of the incumbents’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 3). 
Levitsky and Way describe such regimes as competitive authoritarian, and spend the 
remainder of their book developing and testing a model that can explain why some of them 
‘democratized during the post-Cold War period, while others remained stable and authoritarian 
and still others experienced turnover without democratization’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 5). 
Their model emphasises the importance of international relations but still places significant 
                                                          
5 For more on the reception of this work, please see the introduction to this special issue. 
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weight on domestic factors, most notably, a regime’s willingness and ability to defend itself. 
More specifically, they argue that a regime’s readiness to democratise and the extent to which 
it does so are heavily influenced by the strength of its relations with the United States and 
European Union. Both are considered paragons and active proponents of democracy. 
Levitsky and Way argue that relations with the US and EU take two main forms: linkage 
and leverage. Linkage relates to the ‘density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, 
and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and 
information) among particular countries and the United States, the EU …, and Western-
dominated multilateral institutions’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 43). Leverage, on the other 
hand, ‘encompasses both … regimes’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the West, or their ability to 
avoid Western action aimed at punishing abuse or encouraging political liberalization; and … 
the potential impact (in terms of economic health or security) of Western punitive action toward 
target states’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 40-41). 
A regime’s capacity to withstand any such pressure is also affected by three other 
considerations. The first is the size and strength of its economy. The smaller and weaker it is, 
the less able a regime is to resist any pressure placed upon it. The second is the extent to which 
the United States and European Union coordinate their foreign policies and the consistency 
with which they pursue them. The more US and EU objectives are synchronised and rigorously 
pursed, the greater the pressure on a regime. And the third is the level of assistance provided 
by a black knight or counter-hegemonic power. The more economic, military and/or diplomatic 
support such a power furnishes, the more a regime is able to withstand any pressure put upon 
it (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 41). Levitsky and Way grade Western linkages to and leverage 
over regimes high, medium and low. When linkage is high democratisation is more likely even 
if leverage is low. But when linkage is lower ‘regime outcomes are driven largely by domestic 
factors’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 70-71). 
The most decisive of these domestic factors is the organisational power of a regime. 
For Levitsky and Way, organisational power has two key elements: the state and the party. If 
these are effective a regime is well placed ‘to prevent elite defection, co-opt or repress 
opponents, defuse or crack down on protest[s], and win (or steal) elections’ (Levitsky and Way 
2010, p. 56). Moreover, it is better able to withstand even ‘vigorous opposition challenges’ 
(Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 56). But if the state and party are ineffective a regime is vulnerable 
to ‘relatively weak opposition movements’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 56). By extension, 
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therefore, if external leverage is high a regime with low organisational power is susceptible to 
‘weak opposition challenges’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 71). But if outside leverage is low 
even a regime lacking in organisational power is ‘likely to survive, for they will encounter 
limited external democratizing pressure’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 71). 
 
3. Linkage, leverage and organisational power 
The purpose of this section is to apply Levitsky and Way’s model to Algeria. It does so by 
using the three dimensions and each of their respective sub-dimensions to frame and structure 
its analysis. That is, it focuses on events and actors relevant to the dimension and sub-
dimensions in question. In this way, the section makes a comprehensive and evidenced 
assessment of the strength of Algeria’s links to Europe and North America, the West’s leverage 
over Algiers, and the Bouteflika regime’s organisational capacity.  
 
3.1 Linkage 
Algeria has medium links to European and North American countries. The links between 
countries take a range of forms. Levitsky and Way organise these connections into six 
categories: economic (‘flows of trade investment, and credit’); intergovernmental (‘including 
bilateral diplomatic and military ties as well as participation in Western-led alliances, treaties, 
and international organisations’); technocratic (‘the share of a country’s elite that is educated 
in the West and/or has professional ties to Western universities or Western-led multilateral 
institutions’); social (‘flows of people across borders, including terrorism, immigration and 
refugee flows, and diaspora networks’); information (‘flows of information across borders via 
telecommunications, Internet connections, and Western media penetration’); and civil society 
(‘local ties to Western-based NGOs, international religious and party organisations, and other 
transnational networks’) (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 43-44).6 
                                                          
6 There is an apparent inconsistency in Competitive Authoritarianism over the number of categories of links. In 
the subsection entitled Linkage to the West, Levitsky and Way identify six groupings: economic, 
intergovernmental, technocratic, social, information and civil society (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 43-44). Yet in 
Appendix III: Measuring Linkage, they identify only four categories: economic, social, communication and 
intergovernmental (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 374-375). Based on what they include, the information and 
communication groupings are broadly the same. This paper considers the six categories of links so as to cover the 
greater breadth of connections. 
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 The strength of a country’s linkage to Europe and North America is determined by the 
number and quality of connections between them. Algeria’s economic ties to the West have 
grown stronger over the past 30 years. The forging of these closer bonds was initially triggered 
by the collapse of international oil and gas prices in the mid-1980s. Between 1985 and 1986 
oil prices fell by around 60%, from US$30 per barrel to just US$10 (Ruedy 2005, p. 245). This 
led to a similarly drastic drop in Algeria’s foreign currency earnings and income as the value 
of its oil exports plummeted from US$47 to US$21 billion (Joffé 2002, p. 38). With its revenue 
much reduced and an increasing amount of what it did earn spent on repaying the country’s 
spiralling debts (Dillman 1998, p. 3, pp. 13-14), the Algerian government was forced to turn to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for emergency support (Lowi 2009, 
p. 140; Dillman 1998, pp. 13-14).  
Under the IMF and World Bank’s guidance – first to qualify to receive loans and later 
in accordance with the loan agreements it signed – the Algerian government greatly scaled 
back its public spending, with far-reaching social and political consequences. It then set about 
liberalising its economy, which included placing some state-owned industries up for sale and 
inviting private and foreign investment in others (Meliani, Aghrout and Ammari 2004, p. 94). 
As a result, private and overseas investment in the economy has grown steadily over the past 
20 years, leading to the establishment of significant links between Algiers and selected foreign 
companies and their governments (Witton 2010).  
The West’s willingness to work with Algiers has been further enhanced by the country’s 
vital contribution to the global energy markets, and roles in both combatting Al Qaeda and 
promoting regional security. By 2005, the six largest consumers of Algeria’s gas were Italy, 
Spain, France, Turkey, Portugal and the United States (Le Sueur 2010, p. 108). And for the 
past 25 years, its security forces have been fighting against a range of Islamist terror groups 
targeting Europe and North America (Le Sueur 2010, pp. 146-150). These groups also threaten 
Algeria’s immediate neighbours, some of whom are ill equipped to deal with the danger. The 
size, experience and proven competence of Algeria’s security forces, therefore, make it an 
essential regional partner. 
The presence of large Algerian diaspora communities in their countries are also 
prompting western governments to work more closely with Algiers (Silverstein 2004). The 
World Bank (2011, p. 1) estimated that in 2010 around 3.4% of the total Algerian population 
lived abroad. Economically, the remittances the diaspora sends back to Algeria are worth 
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billions of dollars and help support thousands of families.7 Politically, many of them retain the 
right to vote in Algerian elections, and eight seats are currently reserved for their 
representatives in the Algerian parliament. The security dimension is also important, as 
European governments worry about terrorist infiltration of these communities. One of the main 
reasons Al Qaeda entered into an alliance with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
(Groupe Salafiste pour Prédication et le Combat, GSPC) in January 2007 was to gain access to 
its European sources of funding as well as its networks of members and supporters (Le Sueur 
2010, p. 156).  
Inevitably the existence of this large, extensive population means that numerous well-
developed civil society links connect Algeria and countries with significant Algerian diaspora 
communities. French and European groups in particular, some set up expressly to support and 
represent this trans-national populace, feature prominently on both sides of the Mediterranean 
(Silverstein 2004, p. 227). And the flow of ideas and information they encourage and enable is 
facilitated by modern technology. Cheap mobile telephones and satellite televisions, and easy 
access to email and social media allow ordinary Algerians – especially those residing in the 
coastal towns and cities, where the majority live – to remain fully informed about what is 
happening in the rest of the world and, more crucially, gain access to additional information 
about and alternative interpretations of events in Algeria. 
 
3.2 Leverage 
European and North American governments have low leverage over their Algerian counterpart 
even though economic, intergovernmental, social, information and civil society ties between 
their respective countries have grown in number and strength over the past 30 years. According 
to Levitsky and Way, a regime’s ability to withstand outside pressure (to the extent that it falls 
within the low leverage category) is determined by any one of three criteria: if it has a large 
economy (with a total GDP greater than US$100 billion); is a major oil producer (extracting 
more than one million barrels of oil per day in an average year); or possesses or has access to 
nuclear weapons (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 372). Algeria currently conforms to two of these 
criteria. The World Bank calculated the size of Algeria’s economy in 2013 to be US$210.2 
billion (World Bank 2014, p. 1). And the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
                                                          
7 The World Bank (2011, p. 1) values the money transfers made in 2010, at slightly over US$2 billion. 
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estimated the country’s total average oil production in 2013 to be 1.8 million barrels per day 
(EIA 2014, p. 6). 
Indeed, oil and gas are key enablers of the Algerian regime. The size of the country’s 
proven reserves (12.2 billion barrels of oil and 159 trillion cubic feet of gas) (EIA 2014, p. 5, 
10) and the possibility of further significant discoveries (two-thirds of Algeria’s vast territory 
have yet to be properly explored) (EIA 2014, p. 5) mean that the country is well endowed with 
these valuable and strategically important resources. Indeed, the large size of these reserves 
(Algeria is Africa’s highest gas and third highest oil producer) (EIA 2014, p. 1) makes the 
country a crucial energy provider. And its significance as such has only grown over the past 15 
years because of ongoing instability in other key oil and gas producing regions and the Russian 
government’s attempts to use its gas reserves to put political pressure on Europe. 
Drawing on Michael Ross’s (2001) definition of the resource curse,8 Algeria’s oil and 
gas sales have undermined democracy and strengthened authoritarianism in three key ways. 
First, they have had a rentier effect that occurs when ‘governments use their oil revenues to 
relieve social pressures that might otherwise lead to demands for greater accountability’ (Ross 
2001, p. 332).9 Second, they have had a repression effect that occurs when ‘governments spend 
more on internal security’ to ‘block the population’s democratic aspirations’ (Ross 2001, p. 
335). And third, they have had a modernisation effect whereby, as a result of the economic path 
the country is set on due to its heavy reliance on its oil sector, ‘cultural and social changes’ 
(Ross 2001, p. 336) often critical to democratisation simply do not occur.  
 Algeria has exhibited all three effects. To begin with, it is a rentier state as it ‘derive[s] 
a large fraction of … [its] revenue[] from external rents’ and ‘workers’ remittances … [are] an 
important source of foreign exchange’ (Ross 2001, p. 329). Second, since the early 1990s the 
military has enjoyed exponential budget increases (which have been paid for by oil money) 
                                                          
8 As Ross observes, ‘many of the poorest and most troubled states in the developing world have, paradoxically, 
high levels of natural resource wealth’ (Ross 2001, p. 328). Moreover, ‘states with greater natural resource wealth 
tend to grow more slowly than their resource-poor counterparts … [and] are … more likely to suffer from civil 
wars’ (Ross 2001, p. 328). To these two components of the resource curse, Ross adds a third, that ‘oil and mineral 
wealth tends to makes states less democratic’ (Ross 2001, p. 328). 
9 More specifically, the rentier effect can manifest itself in at least three different forms. It can lead governments 
to use their revenues ‘to tax their populations less heavily or not at all’ in order to dampen their demands for 
‘accountability from – and representation in – their government’ (Ross 2001, p. 332); increase spending on 
patronage, which in turn dampens latent pressures for democratisation’ (Ross 2001, p. 338); and ‘prevent the 
formation of social groups that are independent of the state and … may be inclined to demand greater political 
rights’ (Ross 2001, p. 335). 
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and has consistently acted to curb Algerians’ democratic rights.10 And third, all previous 
attempts to diversify Algeria’s economy have failed to develop any non-hydrocarbon sector to 
the same level as the oil and gas sectors.11  
 European and North American governments’ leverage over their Algerian counterpart 
is further undermined by their competing foreign policy objectives for the country. The most 
significant tension lies not between Paris and Brussels, Madrid and Rome, London and 
Washington, which all broadly want the same things, but between two of the main strands 
common to each of their policies. The first of these is a desire to see democracy strengthened 
and civil and human rights better protected. All of these governments would like Algiers to be 
more democratic and respectful of its citizens’ liberties. And the second is a desire for greater 
political stability, secure access to the country’s oil and gas supplies, and the effective 
containment of the Islamist terror threat (Zoubir 2004, pp. 176-179). 
This tension has long shaped Europe’s and North America’s dealings with the Maghreb, 
especially since the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 September 2001.12 
As a result, the EU has consistently failed to rigorously pursue the lofty ambitions set down in 
its various North Africa strategies.13 Indeed, it has been all too willing to reach compromises 
with the region’s various authoritarian regimes (Dennison 2013, p. 119). This much has been 
acknowledged by both the European Commission and the European Council in their latest 
strategy, the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP), launched on 8 March 
2011 (Echagüe, Michou and Mikail 2011, pp. 329-330). The PfDSP departs from earlier 
strategies, most notably the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), by privileging popular 
demands for greater political rights and freedoms, and advocating the use of positive rather 
than negative conditionality to promote democracy in the region (Teti 2012, p. 267, 272). 
Despite these changes, Europe’s dealings with the Maghreb are still marked by 
inconsistency. Some of the key mechanisms with which the EU proposes to promote 
democracy are either under-developed or continue to under-perform (Dennison 2013, p. 120). 
                                                          
10 By 2009 Algeria’s defence spending was not only the highest in Africa but was also seven times greater than 
what it had been in 1992 (Perlo-Freeman 2012, p. 203).  
11 The most notable attempt to diversify Algeria’s economy was the programme of industrialising industries 
pursued by President Boumedienne in the 1970s (Bennoune 1988, p. 121). 
12 The restrictions President Clinton had imposed on the sale of certain weapons and other military equipment to 
Algiers’ in response to its questionable human rights record were quietly lifted in the wake of the terror attacks 
on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon (Le Sueur 2010, p. 106; Evans and Phillips 2007, p. 255). 
13 The EU’s earlier strategies include the Mediterranean Partnership (1995), the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(2004), and the Union for the Mediterranean (2008) (Echagüe, Michou and Mikail 2011, p. 330).  
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And many EU states still pursue agendas that run counter to the one set down in the PfDSP and 
in ways that are at odds with those advocated by the EU (Echagüe, Michou and Mikail 2011, 
pp. 331-334). Their actions and importance to Algiers ‘as energy clients, security partners and 
exporters of defence equipment and training’ (Dennison 2013, p. 123) inevitably undermine 
the EU’s own message and efforts. As a result, relations between European and North 
American governments and their Algerian counterpart remain dominated by energy and 
security concerns (Dennison 2013, p. 123). 
 Finally, Algeria does not have a black knight patron. Levitsky and Way define a black 
knight as a high-income country (per capita GDP of US$10,000 or more) or major military 
power (with an annual defence budget of more than US$10 billion) (Levitsky and Way 2010, 
pp. 372-372) that provides substantial bilateral aid amounting to at least 1% of the recipient’s 
total GDP. Black knights are usually extra-European and North American powers although 
France has, on occasion, played this role (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 41). In providing this aid, 
a black knight helps inure a regime against other outside influences. No country currently 
provides Algeria with sufficient bilateral aid to qualify as its black knight. France, for instance, 
one of the largest aid investors in the country, has committed €217.2 million of aid since 2000, 
far less than Levitsky and Way’s 1% annual threshold (Agence Française de Développement 
2014, p. 1).  
 
3.3 Organisational power 
The Algerian regime has high organisational power because of its discretionary control of the 
country’s economy, medium party strength and, most crucially, high coercive capacity. 
According to Levitsky and Way, a regime’s coercive capabilities can be classified high if it 
possesses a ‘large, well-trained, and well-equipped security apparatus with an effective 
presence across the national territory … [including] specialised intelligence or internal security 
agencies with demonstrated capacity to penetrate civil society and monitor and repress 
opposition activities at the village and/or neighbourhood level across the country’ (Levitsky 
and Way 2010, p. 376). 
 Algeria has long had a large and politically influential military. The armed forces’ 
current privileged position is mainly the result of the various counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism measures introduced by successive governments from the early 1990s 
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onwards.14 Initially, Algeria’s military was ill-equipped to fight a counterinsurgency campaign. 
Yet from the mid-1990s onwards, it gradually gained the upper hand. Specialist units were 
either established or expanded (Lowi 2005, p. 234). New weapons and equipment were 
procured. Training and doctrine were adapted and improved. Local militia forces were raised 
to guard isolated settlements (Lowi 2005, p. 235) and free up regular army units to pursue 
insurgents (Martinez 2004, p. 21). And by ruthless means, the country’s political and military 
leaders gained a more complete and improved intelligence picture of the insurgency (Evans 
2007, p. 254).  
These reforms have left Algeria with a large, well-funded, well-equipped, battle-
hardened and politically influential military. Moreover, the presence of a small but committed 
rump of fighters with excellent links to Al Qaeda continues to furnish the regime with a 
compelling reason why it needs to maintain these forces at their current high level. Just as 
crucial, however, has been President Bouteflika’s determination to keep them onside. In 
December 2010, his government announced it was giving most of the country’s 170,000 police 
officers a 50% pay rise that would be backdated three years. And 12 months later, it announced 
a similarly generous deal for members of the armed forces raising some salaries by as much as 
40% and backdating all increases by three years again (Volpi 2013, p. 111). 
 Less vital to the regime’s organisational power is party strength. From independence 
until the autumn of 1989, the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) 
was Algeria’s only legal party. And for much of that period, certainly from the late 1960s 
onwards, its strength was high. According to Levitsky and Way, a party’s strength is 
determined by both scope and cohesion. A high scope party is a ‘mass organisation that 
penetrates virtually all population centres down to village and neighbourhood level and/or civil 
society and/or workplace … [and engages in] significant grassroots activity – during and 
between elections – across the national territory’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 377). And a high 
cohesion party is a ‘single governing party that achieved power via violent conflict, including 
revolution or national liberation struggle in which much of the current leadership participated’ 
(Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 377). 
 For nearly 30 years, the FLN had high scope and high cohesion. It had launched the 
war of liberation and steadily confirmed its leadership of the anti-colonial campaign by either 
                                                          
14 The Islamist insurgency which gripped the country throughout this period grew rapidly from 2,000 fighters in 
1992 to 27,000 in 1994 (Lowi 2005, p. 232). 
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eliminating or incorporating other nationalist groups (Le Sueur 2005, p. 186; Evans 2012, p. 
217). All of the country’s post-independence presidents, including those who have held office 
since 1989, have been members of the FLN, and two, Ben Bella and Mohamed Boudiaf, were 
among its founding fathers.15 Indeed, it was the scale of the FLN’s penetration of society, its 
familiarity to most Algerians, and unique and celebrated role in leading the country to 
independence that convinced President Benjedid that it would win the local, regional and 
parliamentary elections he ordered to be held in June 1990 and December 1991. 
 Yet since 1989, party strength has been medium. Again based on scope and cohesion, 
Levitsky and Way define a medium strength party as one that ‘does not meet the criteria for 
high scope but possesses a national organisation that penetrates most population centres and is 
capable of carrying out election campaigns and fielding candidates across the national 
territory,’ and which is either ‘an established party … that does not meet the criteria for high 
cohesion,’ or a ‘new party ([which] has participated in fewer than two national elections) with 
evidence of shared ideology or ethnicity in a context in which that ideological or ethnic 
cleavage is predominant’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 377-378). 
 None of the parties in Algeria today enjoy the advantages that the FLN once did. The 
FLN today is a national organisation and the inheritor of this celebrated name (as well as much 
of the baggage associated with it). The National Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement 
National Démocratique, RND) is also a national party but lacks deep roots as it has always 
been an establishment party, a top-down creation founded in February 1997 as a vehicle for 
President Zéroual and then President Bouteflika.16 Indeed, Zéroual was its first secretary 
general and was succeeded by Ahmed Ouyahia, his one-time prime minister who served two 
more terms as premier under Bouteflika. Yet between them the FLN and RND offer the regime 
considerable reach. In the 2012 parliamentary election the FLN came first, winning 208 (out 
of 462) seats, and the RND second, winning 68 seats (Evans 2012a, p. 1). 
 Finally, the regime exercises significant control over Algeria’s economy. According to 
Levitsky and Way, such discretionary influence can manifest itself either through the existence 
of a ‘state-controlled mineral sector [that] accounts for more than 50 percent of export revenue’ 
or a ‘centrally planned economy that does not undergo large-scale privatisation’ (Levitsky and 
                                                          
15 The FLN was established in 1954 by nine men: Hocine Ait Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella, Larbi Ben M’Hidi, 
Mustapha Ben Boulaid, Mohamed Boudiaf, Rabah Bitat, Mourad Didouche, Mohamed Khider and Belkacem 
Krim (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, p. 14n). 
16 Bouteflika stood as both the FLN and RND’s candidate in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections. 
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Way 2010, p. 378). The Bouteflika regime, like all its post-independence predecessors, is able 
to influence and shape the economy by both means. SONATRACH, the state operated 
hydrocarbon company, owns around 80% of all oil and gas produced in Algeria (EIA 2014, p. 
4), while hydrocarbon sales abroad generate around 95% of the country’s total export earnings 
(EIA 2014, p. 1). 
From independence until the early 1980s, successive governments pursued explicitly 
socialist economic programmes that privileged central economic planning. Then with gathering 
speed from the early 1980s onwards, the regime pursued liberalisation and sought greater 
private and overseas investment. Yet despite these measures, the state remains a major 
economic actor because of its control over the crucial hydrocarbon sectors that generate around 
60% of its total income (EIA 2014, p. 1). Moreover, in recent years, as the country’s debt 
service ratio has fallen to more manageable levels owing to the record high international oil 
and gas prices, President Bouteflika has strengthened national control of the economy, passing 
legislation in 2009 requiring all companies to be at least 51% Algerian-owned (U.S. 
Department of State 2013, p. 1). 
 
4. Origins and development of the regime 
The purpose of this section is to chart Algeria’s transformation into a competitive authoritarian 
regime. From 1989 to 1992 Algeria had a multi-party system in which the best advantaged 
party, the FLN, repeatedly lost out to its rivals.17 Then from January 1992 to November 1995, 
Algeria was an authoritarian regime as no presidential or parliamentary elections were held. 
And since November 1995, Algeria has been a competitive authoritarian regime as Presidents 
Zéroual and Bouteflika have allowed multi-party elections to take place for all levels of 
government but have ensured that regime-backed candidates and parties enjoy significant 
advantages over their rivals. 
 More specifically, Algeria’s transformation has encompassed three main parts. The first 
has entailed the careful screening of participants. Those standing for election, and especially 
presidential candidates, are subjected to the closest scrutiny both in accordance with electoral 
                                                          
17 In the local and regional elections held on 12 June 1990, the FLN retained control of just 487 municipal and 
14 wilaya councils compared to the 853 and 32 taken by the FIS (Hill 2009, p. 135). Then in the parliamentary 
election held on 26 December 1991 it retained just 15 seats compared to the 188 won by the FIS and 25 taken by 
the Socialist Forces Front (Front des Forces Socialistes, FFS) (Hill 2009, p. 137). 
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law and beyond it. Mahfoud Nahnah, the veteran leader of the Movement for a Peaceful Society 
(Mouvement pour la Société de la Paix, MSP), was prevented from entering the 1999 
presidential election because he could not provide evidence of having fought in the war of 
liberation. This remains the only occasion such a qualification has been enforced. And Ali 
Benflis, Bouteflika’s former prime minister and secretary general of the FLN, was impeded in 
the 2004 presidential election when Bouteflika used the courts to delay and dilute his 
nomination by the FLN as its official candidate.18  
This does not mean that genuine opponents are never allowed to participate. Nahnah 
ran in the 1995 presidential election and won around 25% of the vote (it was this success that 
almost certainly led to his being excluded from the 1999 election). Said Sadi, the long-time 
leader of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la 
Démocratie, RCD) took part in the 1995 and 2004 elections (but boycotted the 1999 and 2009 
votes). And Louisa Hanoune, leader of the Workers’ Party (Parti des Travailleurs, PT) 
participated in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections. It is now established practice for the rules to 
be changed on an ad hoc, election-by-election basis to ensure the regime’s preferred candidate 
wins. 
Political parties are also closely controlled. The Islamic Salvation Front (Front 
Islamique du Salut, FIS) is still outlawed despite repeated calls from opposition groups and 
leaders for its re-legalisation.19 The Movement for an Islamic Society (Al-Harakat li-Mujtama` 
Islamimi, HAMAS) and Islamic Renaissance Movement (Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique, 
MNI) have both been forced to change their names – to the Movement for a Peaceful Society 
and the Renaissance Movement (Mouvement de la Nahda, MN) respectively – to comply with 
article 42 of the 1996 constitution that forbids parties from appealing exclusively to specific 
religious, linguistic or racial communities (République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire 
1996, Article 42).20 And both Zéroual and Bouteflika have allowed and encouraged the 
                                                          
18 Benflis did eventually stand in the election as a FLN candidate. But as a result of Bouteflika’s actions, the FLN 
split with part of it nominating Benflis and part of it Bouteflika (Layachi 2014, p. 146n).  
19 A high point in this pressure was the publication of the so-called Sant’Egidio Platform on 13 January 1995. The 
Platform was the outcome of a series of meetings between the leaders of the main opposition parties (FLN, FFS, 
MSP, PT and the Movement for Democracy in Algeria (Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie, MDA) and 
those senior FIS figures not in prison at the Sant’Egidio religious community in Rome. As well as calling for the 
separation of powers, the re-establishment of a multi-party system, Tamazight to be given equal status with Arabic, 
and the government to foreswear the use of violence for political purposes, it also demanded that the ban on the 
FIS be lifted. Even though many of its objectives matched his own, President Zéroual summarily rejected the 
Platform because he saw it as a threat to his authority (Le Sueur 2010, pp. 66-67). 
20 This had been a provision of the 1989 constitution as well, but had not been enforced. 
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establishment of new parties which, by participating in political life, have helped to legitimise 
the parameters set by Zéroual and Bouteflika. Moreover, the higher the number of parties the 
greater the chance the opposition vote will be split and thus the easier it becomes for Bouteflika 
and other regime politicians to be (re)elected. 
The second part of Zéroual and Bouteflika’s rehabilitation process has entailed aiding 
and abetting their preferred candidates and parties. In the run-up to the 2009 presidential 
election, Bouteflika, and the RND and FLN were advantaged in several significant ways. First, 
Bouteflika began campaigning earlier than he was permitted to (Freedom House 2011, p. 20). 
Second, his campaign was given not only more coverage but also more favourable coverage 
by the media than those of his rivals. The Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights 
(Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Driots de l’Homme, LADDH) calculated that 88.5% of 
television and radio, and 27.6% of press coverage of the election focused sympathetically on 
him (Freedom House 2011, p. 20). Third, and in violation of electoral law, Bouteflika promised 
lucrative public contracts to private businessmen in return for their financial backing, making 
his campaign by far the best funded (Freedom House 2011, p. 20). 
The third and final part of the rehabilitation process has been the manipulation of the 
votes themselves. Under Zéroual and Bouteflika, Algeria has had five presidential (1995, 1999, 
2004, 2009 and 2014) and four parliamentary elections (1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012), and three 
national referendums (1996, 1999 and 2005).21 Some of these elections have been freer and 
fairer than others. The 1995 presidential and 2012 parliamentary ballots were two of the fairest. 
The 1997 parliamentary election was less fair, leading several opposition parties to file 
complaints with the Constitutional Council. And election monitors and opposition parties 
raised serious concerns about the conduct of the 1999, 2004 and 2009 presidential, and the 
2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections. Indeed, so extensive was the malpractice witnessed by 
the EU, US, OSCE and UN during the 1999 and 2004 presidential elections that they all refused 
to send any observers to oversee the 2009 vote (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
2009, p. 1),22 which was also marked by widespread allegations of ballot box stuffing and 
                                                          
21 The 1996 referendum was to approve a new national constitution (passed), the 1999 referendum to approve an 
amnesty for Islamist insurgents (Law of Civil Concord, passed), and the 2005 referendum to approve a second 
amnesty (Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, passed). 
22 Nevertheless the outcome of the 2009 election, which was widely questioned by both domestic monitors and 
opposition parties, was still accepted by Paris, Brussels, London and Washington. Of course concerns were raised 
and hopes for greater rigour and transparency in the future were voiced. But such doubts were made sotto voce 
and were not considered sufficiently serious to prevent either President Hollande or Prime Minister Cameron from 
paying historic and highly symbolic visits later on. 
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thefts, repeat voting, and other irregularities (Freedom House 2011, p. 19). The conduct of the 
most recent 2014 presidential election has also been widely condemned by opposition parties 
and the defeated candidate, Ali Benflis (Aljazeera 2014, p. 1). 
These iniquities undoubtedly helped fuel the various protests that were staged in Algiers 
and other towns and cities from December 2010 through to January 2012, and sporadically 
throughout 2013. The Algerian opposition bears noteworthy similarities to both its successful 
counterparts in Tunisia and Libya, and its less effective equivalent in Morocco, but is different 
from them all in at least one crucial respect. All of the region’s protest movements sprang from 
surprising sources, as none of them were initially built around or led by an established 
opposition party (to the extent that such bodies were allowed to exist and operate in their 
respective political systems). Rather, these movements were more spontaneous coalescences 
of civil society groups. Moreover, Islamic organisations featured far less prominently in the 
early protests than they did in the political settlements forged afterwards.23  
The protestors in Tunisia have achieved far more dramatic results than their comrades 
in either Morocco or Algeria and, in so doing, paved the way for yet more fundamental change. 
Ben Ali’s departure and the subsequent outlawing of his party, the Democratic Constitutional 
Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, RCD), on 6 February 2011, created an 
extraordinary political opening in which they can compete. And since then, they have been able 
to influence the various transitional governments that have assumed power, participate in the 
prolonged debate over the new constitution and shape the new political order that is being 
established.24 
In contrast, the 20 February Movement – the broad coalition that came to lead the pro-
democracy protests in Morocco – did not accomplish anything nearly as profound. Ousting the 
king, the main locus of power in the country, was never a popular or realistic objective. His 
endurance inevitably meant that the Movement was not presented with the same scale of 
opportunity as were the protestors in Tunisia. Moreover, the palace responded quickly and 
adeptly to the demonstrations. On 9 March 2011, just two and half weeks after the Movement 
was established, the king launched a royal commission to review the constitution and 
                                                          
23 The Islamist Justice and Development Party (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD) and Ennahda have 
won legislative elections in Morocco and Tunisia respectively. 
24 The new constitution was overwhelmingly approved by Tunisia’s Constituent Assembly on 26 January 2014. 
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recommend ways in which it could be reformed.25 The creation of the commission not only 
enabled the palace to regain control of the debate over the constitution, but also allowed it to 
marginalise the Movement and re-establish the official opposition parties as the (approved) 
conveyors of the public’s demands and grievances (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013, pp. 230-
231). Although the 20 February Movement continues to organise protests, it is not nearly as 
large or threatening to the regime as it once was.  
Ostensibly the protests in Algeria followed a similar pattern as those in Morocco. The 
early, spontaneous demonstrations soon came to be orchestrated and led by a body called the 
National Co-ordination for Change and Democracy (Coordination Nationale pour le 
Changement et la Démocratie, CNCD), an umbrella organisation comprised of a range of 
opposition political parties and civil society groups. And just as King Mohamed did, President 
Bouteflika responded by quickly undertaking a series of popular and highly symbolic reforms, 
including lifting the state of emergency that had been in place since January 1992, and 
promising to review and make changes to the constitution. Unlike in Morocco, however, the 
gradual decrease in the number of protests, along with the size and intensity of those that 
continued to be held, was not due primarily to the government’s skilful appropriation of the 
demonstrators’ agenda. Rather, it was because of popular trepidation born of recent, painful 
experience.  
Indeed, from the moment the protests began, parallels with the Black October riots of 
1988 were drawn in the press and elsewhere (Volpi 2013, p. 107). While these comparisons 
provided the security forces with a timely reminder to be on their best behaviour, they also 
drew attention to the deaths, disappearances, injuries, and suffering of the previous 20 years. 
During this period around 150,000 people were killed (Martinez 2004, p. 15) and thousands 
more simply vanished (Le Sueur 2005, p. 320). Arbitrary detentions, torture and summary 
executions were frequent. It was against this historic backdrop, therefore, that the Maghreb 
Spring protests took place in Algeria.  
 
5. Conclusion 
                                                          
25 The new constitution was approved by referendum on 1 July 2011. 
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Algeria is a case of medium linkage, low leverage and high organisational power that together 
help explain the durability of competitive authoritarianism there. As such, it bears out Levitsky 
and Way’s thesis on the importance of linkage and leverage, and leverage and organisational 
power. Algeria’s medium linkage means that its political development is driven by domestic 
factors. And the regime’s high organisational power means that it is well placed to withstand 
both opposition challenges and any pressure placed upon it by the EU and US. The regime’s 
build-up and maintenance of its high coercive capacity has been greatly facilitated by the large 
revenues it has earned from its oil and gas sectors. And what pressure has been exerted by the 
West since the start of the Maghreb Spring has been compromised by the United States’ and 
Europe’s haphazard coordination of their foreign policy goals, and the pursuit of incompatible 
and competing objectives by the EU and individual European governments. 
The paper makes three important and original contributions. It is the first to use 
Levitsky and Way’s dimensions of linkage, leverage and organisational power to structure an 
analysis of Algeria’s recent political development. In so doing, it draws attention to the 
country’s changed and changing relationship with Europe and North America. This 
relationship and Algeria’s ability to neutralise, offset and withstand at least some of the 
democratising pressure placed upon it by Paris, Brussels, London and Washington is critical to 
explaining its evolution into a competitive authoritarian regime. Second, the paper extends 
Levitsky and Way’s concepts to a country to which they have never before been applied and 
to a regime type (one in which the military holds tutelary power) that they purposely excluded 
from their choice of case studies in their 2010 book. The paper rejects the original limitation 
they impose by demonstrating the applicability of their dimensions to Algeria and other similar 
countries. 
 Third, the paper helps counteract the deficit of studies into Algeria over the past few 
years by explaining why Bouteflika’s regime has endured while those of Ben Ali and Gadhafi 
have not. The critical difference between these regimes has been Bouteflika’s high 
organisational power and ability to retain sufficient control over Algeria’s large and effective 
military. Unlike its Algerian counterpart, the Tunisian army did not play nearly as prominent a 
role in securing independence. As a result, it has never commanded the same degree of political 
influence and popular prestige. Moreover, both Presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali took care to 
exclude its officers from political life (Joffé 2011, p. 519). So when mass demonstrations broke 
out in many of the country’s major towns and cities in late December 2011 and early January 
2012, it refused to fire on the protestors as it had no great vested interest in preserving the 
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regime. The burden of defending the government fell instead to the police and security services, 
which were quickly overwhelmed by the task (Joffé 2011, p. 519). 
Relations between Gadhafi and the Libyan armed forces were even more strained. As 
the leader of the small group of army officers who ousted King Idris from power in 1969, 
Gadhafi understood only too well the military’s importance to his regime’s survival. To stop it 
doing to him what he had done to his predecessor, he placed strict limits on the activities in 
which its members could engage (Joffé 2011, p. 522). And to dilute its influence still further 
and offer him an alternative source of coercive power, he established a militia made up of 
Tuareg tribesmen from northern Mali. The suspicion and, at times, barely concealed contempt 
with which he treated his military, especially after its humiliating defeat by Chad’s forces in 
1987 (Joffé 2011, p. 522), ensured that many of its officers felt little loyalty towards him. This 
much was confirmed by the number of units that quickly sided with the rebels once the civil 
war began in February 2011. And the regime suffered further catastrophic desertions in July 
that year when around 3,000 Tuareg fighters quit Libya for northern Mali, taking all of their 
weapons, equipment and vehicles with them (Zoubir 2012, p. 454; Lounnas 2013, pp. 328-
329). Inevitably, these defections greatly impaired the regime’s ability to defend itself. 
Finally, as well as possessing the means to survive, the Algerian regime also boasts the 
know-how and determination. The country continues to be governed by men (and a few 
women) who fought in the war of liberation. The wealth of experience this gave them for 
grinding out results has been added to by the long and ongoing struggle against the Islamist 
insurgents and terrorists. The importance of this experience is highlighted by Way (2011, p. 
20), who observes that ‘the existence or absence of a recent revolutionary struggle largely 
explains which communist regimes survived in 1989 and which did not. The ones that outlasted 
the end of the Cold War – China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam – were all led by veterans 
of revolutionary struggles’. Unlike the leaders of any other Maghreb country, Algerian leaders 
have successfully resisted two committed and capable foes. Thus they are well versed in doing 
what is necessary to ensure political survival. 
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